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                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           ___________ 
 
                           No. 00-5200                       
                           ___________ 
                                                        
                 COAST AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, LTD., 
         a Delaware Corporation d/b/a/ TSE MOTOR CARS, 
                                 
                                     Appellant 
                                 
                                v. 
                                 
     VW CREDIT, INC., a Corporation; VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, 
   a Corporation; AUDI OF AMERICA, a Corporation; MARGE YOST; 
               MICHAEL RUECKERT; STEPHEN JOHNSON 
                                          
                           ___________ 
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of New Jersey 
 
    District Court Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
                   (D.C. Civil No. 97-2601(GEB) 
                           ___________ 
 
                    Argued on December 7, 2001 
 
       Before: MANSMANN, ROTH, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
               (Opinion Filed:   January 29, 2002) 
                     ________________________ 
 
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     ________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
     This is an appeal by Plaintiff Coast Automotive Group, Ltd. ("Coast") 
from a 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant VW Credit, Inc and several 
of its 
employees. (collectively "VCI").  Coast's primary contention on appeal is 
that the 
District Court improperly invoked judicial estoppel to dismiss its claims.  
Because we 
conclude that the District Judge failed to apply the standards for the use 
of judicial 
estoppel in accordance with this Court's decision in Montrose Med. Group 
Participating 
Sav. Plan et al. v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773 (3d Cir. 2001), we vacate as to 
claims dismissed 
on the basis of judicial estoppel.  However, we hold that the District 
Court did not err in 
any of its other findings, and therefore affirm the grant of summary 
judgment on claims 
dismissed on a basis independent of judicial estoppel. 
 
                                I 
     Coast owns new vehicle dealership franchises in Toms River, New 
Jersey.  VCI 
provided Coast with floor plan financing beginning in 1991.  Under a 
series of Master 
Security Agreements ("Agreements"), VCI advanced funds to Coast for the 
purchase of 
vehicle inventory and Coast granted VCI a security interest in the 
vehicles, the proceeds 
from sale of the vehicles, and in other assets of Coast.  Coast paid 
interest on the 
advances to VCI, and the agreements stated that when Coast sold a vehicle 
from 
inventory, the principal on the advance would be "promptly and fully paid 
off" to VCI. 
The agreements dictated that Coast would hold any unpaid and past due 
indebtedness "in 
trust" for VCI, but they did not specify a deadline or time period for 
payment of 
principal.  The agreements contained default provisions under which VCI 
had the right to 
terminate the Agreement, refuse to advance additional funds, and 
accelerate and declare 
all debt immediately due if Coast defaulted on its obligations. 
     On December 12, 1995, VCI called Coast into default and, under the 
default 
provisions, terminated its credit line with Coast and accelerated the 
remaining 
outstanding balance of Coast's debt to VCI, a debt totaling over $6 
million.  VCI also 
filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division 
against Coast, 
Coast President Tamim Shansab, and others.  VCI alleged that Coast had 
failed to pay off 
48 vehicles in a timely fashion, and VCI sought to force Coast to repay 
its total debt and 
enjoin Coast from disposing of VCI's collateral.  Three days later on 
December 15, 1995, 
Coast filed a Chapter 11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of 
New Jersey. 
     On December 13, 1995, at a hearing in the New Jersey Superior Court 
matter, the 
court engaged in a colloquy regarding Coast's debt status with Coast's 
counsel Richard 
S. Mazawey:   
                         THE COURT:     Well, isn't the company out of 
trust as they say? 
                    MAZAWEY:  Yes it is, Judge, at the present. 
     ... 
                    MAZAWEY:  And, what we're saying is, is that due to 
the diligent notice 
               and the good faith of the Defendant, in light of that 
               circumstance, in light of there being a short fall in 
trust, 
               which we disagree, your Honor, as to the extent of the 
short 
               fall. 
                         THE COURT:     I know, but if you say there's 
300,000 but it's a million-four, 
                    well that still leaves a million-one. 
                    MAZAWEY:  Well, in actuality, Judge, there's just 
about 700,000... 
 
VCI App. at 304-05.  In a hearing in the Bankruptcy Court on January 18, 
1996, Shansab 
testified concerning the state of Coast's indebtedness to VCI in response 
to questioning 
by the Bankruptcy Judge, the Honorable Stephen A. Stripp:     
                         THE COURT:     You didn't   you didn't testify   
because you weren't asked 
                    whether   the Debtor was in default to VCI on the   
floor 
                    plan line when   VCI took the action that it took in 
State 
                    Court, was it?       
                         SHANSAB:       Was I in default, sir? 
                         THE COURT:     Yes. 
                         SHANSAB:       Yes. 
     ... 
                         THE COURT:     ...What was the nature of the 
default? 
                         SHANSAB:       Principal payments had not been 
made on units. ... 
                         THE COURT:     Have you ever heard the term, "out 
of trust?" 
                         SHANSAB:       Yes, Your Honor 
     ... 
                         THE COURT:     What does it mean to you? 
                         SHANSAB:       It means that you have   sold a 
car and you have not remitted 
                    payment in time. 
                         THE COURT:     Is that what transpired?  Was that 
part of the default here of 
                    the Debtor with respect to this   working capital 
line? 
                         SHANSAB:       To the floor plan line you mean? 
                         THE COURT:     Floor plan line. 
                         SHANSAB:       Yes, Your Honor. 
                         THE COURT:     And how much were you out of 
trust? 
                         SHANSAB:       The day I sat down with the   with 
the gentleman from VCI, 
                    the calculations that we came up with were in the 
700,000 
                    range. 
 
VCI App. at 324-25.  The next day, Shansab and his bankruptcy counsel Gary 
Marks 
made further statements regarding Coast's debt status under cross-
examination by VCI 
counsel Stephen Ryan: 
                         RYAN:          Okay.  In fact, you'd sold some 
cars to customers, Coast had 
                    received payment from third party finance sources or 
from the 
                    buyer directly for those purchases, is that right? 
                         SHANSAB:       That is correct. 
                         RYAN:          Coast didn't make any payment to 
VCI for the sale of those 
                    cars did it? 
                         THE COURT:     Isn't it stipulated that there is 
$700,000 out of trust, Mr. 
                    Marks? 
                         MARKS:         I believe that was Mr. Shansad's 
[sic] testimony yesterday.  I 
                    don't know that they have stipulated to that amount, 
but that 
                    was his testimony. 
                         THE COURT:     All right. 
                         RYAN:          Judge, we would stipulate that 
there are out of trust sales and 
                    that is what I'm trying to establish   
                         THE COURT:     Well, it is stipulated.  So let's 
not waste time going over facts 
                    that are stipulated.  He stipulates that he is out of 
trust. 
                         RYAN:          You were out of trust with VCI 
before you filed your petition 
                    in Bankruptcy? 
                         SHANSAB:       That is correct. 
 
VCI App. at 330-31. 
     Several months later, in a deposition for the New Jersey Superior 
Court 
proceedings on July 23, 1996, Shansab attempted to explain that his prior 
testimony to 
the Bankruptcy Court was based on information provided to him by VCI and 
did not 
reflect his personal understanding that Coast had defaulted or was "out of 
trust": 
                         STEWART:       Do you understand "out of trust" 
to mean you sold a car and 
                    you have not remitted payment in time?  Is that your 
                    understanding of "out of trust," sir? 
                         SHANSAB:       My understanding is that I have a 
line of credit with VCI, and 
                    I don't believe I've ever been out of trust. 
                         STEWART:       Do you recall testifying under 
oath on January 18, 1996? 
     ... [Shansab reviews a transcript of the Bankruptcy Court testimony] 
... 
                         SHANSAB:       To me out of trust in this case is 
when you can't trust your 
                    lender, and in this case I'm certainly   VCI is 
certainly out of 
                    trust with me. 
                         STEWART:       Sir, is this the answer that you 
gave to Judge Stripp? [reads 
                    Shansab the bankruptcy testimony]... You said that 
right? ... 
                         SHANSAB:       This happened under extreme 
pressure, and at that time I had 
                    no information as to what VCI's actions had been up to 
that 
                    point, and, you know, when I testified here, all I had 
to rely 
                    on was what Steve Johnson and VCI had been telling me 
up 
                    to that point. 
                         STEWART:       Based on what Steve Johnson had 
been telling you up to that 
                    point, did you understand that you were out of trust? 
                         SHANSAB:       I have never been out of trust, 
period... 
     ... 
                         STEWART:       Sir, the sworn testimony that you 
gave to Judge Stripp ... with 
                    respect to out of trust, that's not accurate, is it? 
                         SHANSAB:       I didn't say that, Mr. Stewart.  I 
said that everything I had to 
                    rely on at that point is the word of a Steven Johnson 
from 
                    VCI... 
     ... 
                         STEWART:       Did you state anywhere in your 
testimony to Judge Stripp that 
                    you were relying upon the information provided by 
Steve 
                    Johnson? 
                         SHANSAB:       I don't believe that that question 
ever came up... 
               ...   
                         STEWART:       But you did testify to Judge 
Stripp under oath that the 
                    calculations that you came up with Steve Johnson, that 
it was 
                    that you were out of trust in the $700,000 range? 
                         SHANSAB:       I never calculated that.  That was 
Steven Johnson -- I've 
                    answered the question that we came up with that.  I 
never sat 
                    down with Steven Johnson and came up with that 
calculation 
                    like that...  
                                        I did not sit down with Steven 
Johnson, go over any figures.  
                    He sat down, went over his own figures.  
 
Coast App. at 602a-606a. 
     On January 21, 1997, Coast filed an adversary proceeding in the 
Bankruptcy Court 
against VCI, several VCI employees, and VCI's parent companies Volkswagen 
of 
America (VOA) and Audi of America (AOA).  Because Coast demanded a jury 
trial, the 
case was referred to the District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
Coast's Complaint 
contained 16 claims against VCI, all stemming from the basic allegation 
that VCI's call 
of Coast into default was wrongful and constituted a breach of the 
Agreements. 
     VCI filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims against it on 
November 
11, 1997.  Among other filings in response to VCI's motion, Coast 
submitted a 
Certification of Tamim Shansab in which Shansab reiterated the explanation 
of his 
Bankruptcy Court testimony that he provided in his state court deposition.  
See Coast 
App. at 135a-139a (Certification of Tamim Shansab).   
     In an order issued on April 24, 1998, the District Court granted VCI 
summary 
judgment on Counts 1-13 and 16 of Coast's complaint.  Judge Brown invoked 
the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel to find Coast had defaulted on its 
obligations under the 
Agreements.  The parties did not brief judicial estoppel, nor did the 
issue arise in oral 
argument before the District Court.  Yet the court applied judicial 
estoppel to bar Coast 
from claiming that it was not in default because Shansab and Coast's 
counsel had 
represented in the bankruptcy hearing and the state court hearing that it 
was in default 
and "out of trust." 
     The court concluded that "[t]he record clearly indicates that Coast 
had defaulted 
on the agreements by failing to make payments to VCI and was consequently 
'out of 
trust.'"  Coast Automotive Group v. VW Credit, Inc. et al., Civ. No. 97-
2601(GEB), at 5- 
6 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 1998) (hereinafter "Coast I") (citing Shansab's 
testimony before the 
Bankruptcy Court and counsel's statements to the Bankruptcy Court and the 
New Jersey 
Superior Court).  In a footnote, the court considered Shansab's 
explanation of his 
Bankruptcy Court statements in his state court deposition and in the 
summary judgment 
certification, but decided that because Shansab contradicted himself on 
the meaning of 
"out of trust," such inconsistent statements could not be used to create 
material issues of 
fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.  Id. at 6 n.2. 
     In finding that Coast defaulted under the Agreements, the court 
stated:  
                    Thus, under default provisions in the agreements, VCI 
was entitled to 
          declare all of Coast's indebtedness payable on demand.  
Plaintiff avers that 
          Coast had a grace period in which to make its payments under the 
          agreements, and that in the past, Coast had made payments on 
principal 
          advanced between 5 to 28 days from the date of a vehicle's sale.  
However, 
          as the record clearly indicates, plaintiff had defaulted on the 
agreements 
          with VCI and plaintiff may not now contradict its prior 
assertions and 
          stipulations in an attempt to defeat summary judgment. 
 
"Coast I" at 6 (emphasis added).  In a footnote appended to end of this 
passage, the court 
explained that it made this finding of default under the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel: 
                    The doctrine of judicial estoppel "serves a 
consistently clear and undisputed 
          jurisprudential purpose: to protect the integrity of the 
courts."  See 
          McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616 (3d Cir. 1996), 
cert. 
          denied 117 S.Ct. 958 (1997).  This doctrine, which "is an 
equitable doctrine 
          invoked by a court at its discretion," see id. at 617, precludes 
a party from 
          assuming a position in a legal proceeding that contradicts or is 
inconsistent 
          with a previously asserted position.  See Ryan Operations G.P. 
v. Santiam- 
          Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996).  While 
judicial 
          estoppel is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies, it is 
designed to 
          prevent litigants from "playing fast and loose with the courts."  
See id.  
          Thus, as plaintiff had stipulated in the Bankruptcy proceedings 
that Coast 
          was out of trust, plaintiff may not assert a contrary position 
before this 
          Court at this time.   
 
Coast I at 6 n.3 (emphasis added).   
     The judicial estoppel finding of default served as the basis for 
dismissal of several 
of Coast's claims, while summary judgment was granted on other claims on a 
basis 
independent of judicial estoppel.  In a second summary judgment order on 
October 6, 
1999, the District Court granted VCI summary judgment on the remaining two 
claims 
against VCI   Counts 14 and 15.  See Coast Automotive Group v. VW Credit, 
Inc. et al., 
Civ. No. 97-2601(GEB), at 6 (D.N.J. October 6, 1999) (hereinafter "Coast 
II").  In 
dismissing these discrimination claims, the court relied heavily on the 
finding in its 
previous order that based on the application of judicial estoppel, Coast 
had defaulted on 
the Agreements and therefore VCI had the right to accelerate Coast's debt 
and terminate 
future lending under the default provisions. 
     VCI filed a motion for certification of the two summary judgment 
orders as a final 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).  The court granted 
this motion on 
January 26, 2000, and denied Coast's motion to stay this order on February 
25, 2000.  
This appeal followed, and because the summary judgment orders were 
properly certified 
as a final judgment, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291.   
                                II 
                                A. 
     Coast primarily argues on appeal that the District Court erred in 
applying judicial 
estoppel sua sponte and without making the necessary findings and analysis 
under the 
settled law of this Court.  While we exercise plenary review over grants 
of summary 
judgment, we examine the use of judicial estoppel for abuse of discretion.  
"Though a 
district court's ultimate decision to invoke the doctrine is reviewed only 
for abuse of 
discretion... a court 'abuses its discretion when its ruling is founded on 
an error of law or 
a misapplication of law to the facts.'" Montrose Med. Group Participating 
Sav. Plan v. 
Bulger et al., 243 F.3d 773, 780 (3d Cir. 2001) (Becker, J.) (quotations 
omitted). 
     In Montrose, we reiterated and explained the requirements which must 
be met 
before a district court may properly invoke judicial estoppel: 
                    Judicial estoppel may be imposed only if: (1) the 
party to be estopped is 
          asserting a position that is irreconcilably inconsistent with 
one he or she 
          asserted in a prior proceeding; (2) the party changed his or her 
position in 
          bad faith, i.e., in a culpable manner threatening to the court's 
authority or 
          integrity; and (3) the use of judicial estoppel is tailored to 
address the 
          affront to the court's authority or integrity. 
 
Montrose, 243 F.3d at 777-78.  A district court may not invoke judicial 
estoppel without 
conducting these three inquiries.  Id. at 780 n.4 (discussing third 
element).  In Montrose 
we also held that "a party has not displayed bad faith for judicial 
estoppel purposes if the 
initial claim was never accepted or adopted by a court or agency."  Id. at 
778.  We further 
elaborated on the bad faith requirement and explained that a specific 
finding of bad faith 
must be made: 
                    Inconsistencies are not sanctionable unless a litigant 
has taken one or both 
          positions "in bad faith--i.e., with intent to play fast and 
loose with the 
          court."  Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 
F.3d 
          355, 361 (3d Cir.1996).  A finding of bad faith "must be based 
on more 
          than" the existence of an inconsistency, Klein v. Stahl GMBH & 
Co. 
          Maschinefabrik, 185 F.3d 98, 111 (3d Cir.1999) (emphasis added); 
indeed, 
          a litigant has not acted in "bad faith" for judicial estoppel 
purposes unless 
          two requirements are met. First, he or she must have behaved in 
a manner 
          that is somehow culpable. See Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 362 
(stating that 
          judicial estoppel may not be employed unless "'intentional self 
          contradiction is ... used as a means of obtaining unfair 
advantage'" (quoting 
          Scarano v. Central R. Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d 
Cir.1953) 
          (emphasis added))); id. ("An inconsistent argument sufficient to 
invoke 
          judicial estoppel must be attributable to intentional 
wrongdoing." (emphasis 
          added)); see also In re Chambers Dev. Co. Inc., 148 F.3d 214, 
229 (3d 
          Cir.1998) (quoting this language from Ryan Operations). 
 
                    Second, a litigant may not be estopped unless he or 
she has engaged in 
          culpable behavior vis-a-vis the court.... Accordingly, judicial 
estoppel may 
          not be employed unless a litigant's culpable conduct has 
assaulted the 
          dignity or authority of the court. 
 
Montrose, 243 F.3d at 780-81 (emphasis added).     
 
     With regard to the third prong   tailoring application of the 
doctrine to the specific 
harm    we stated:  
                    Observing that judicial estoppel "is often the 
harshest remedy" that a court 
          can impose for inequitable conduct, we have held that a district 
court may 
          not invoke the doctrine unless: (1) "no sanction established by 
the Federal 
          Rules or a pertinent statute is up to the task of remedying the 
damage done 
          by a litigant's malfeasance;" and (2) "the sanction [of judicial 
estoppel] is 
          tailored to address the harm identified." Klein v. Stahl GMBH & 
Co. 
          Maschinefabrik, 185 F.3d 98, 108, 110 (3d Cir.1999) (internal 
quotation 
          marks and citations omitted).  
 
Montrose, 243 F.3d at 784. 
     Finally, we expressed particular concern in Montrose with the sua 
sponte 
application of judicial estoppel: 
                    We have held that a district court need not always 
conduct an evidentiary 
          hearing before finding the existence of bad faith for judicial 
estoppel 
          purposes... but two precepts are nevertheless clear.  First, a 
court 
          considering the use of judicial estoppel should ensure that the 
party to be 
          estopped has been given a meaningful opportunity to provide "an 
          explanation" for its changed position.  Cleveland v. Policy 
Management 
          Sys., 526 U.S. 795, 807 (1999).  Second, though a court may 
sometimes 
          "discern" bad faith without holding an evidentiary hearing, it 
may not do so 
          if the ultimate finding of bad faith cannot be reached without 
first resolving 
          genuine disputes as to the underlying facts.  
 
Montrose, 243 F.3d at 780 n.5.   
 
                                B. 
     In this case, the District Court applied judicial estoppel against 
Coast sua sponte 
and without the complete analysis required by this Court.  At most, the 
court found only 
that the inconsistency prong of the judicial estoppel test was satisfied, 
as the court held 
that Shansab stated to the Bankruptcy Court that Coast was "out of trust" 
and in default, 
and that his later statements insufficiently explained that testimony.  
The court  
concluded that Coast could not argue on summary judgment that it was not 
in default, 
and therefore many of Coast's claims failed because VCI properly exercised 
its rights 
under the default provisions in the Agreement.  However, to invoke 
judicial estoppel, a 
court must do more than merely find that a party advanced inconsistent 
positions to the 
court.  The District Court here failed to engage in the requisite analysis 
and make the 
necessary findings that Coast changed its position in bad faith and that 
the application of 
judicial estoppel was specifically tailored to address the harm caused by 
Coast's alleged 
inconsistencies.  Additionally, in raising the issue sua sponte, the court 
failed to allow the 
parties to brief the issue and inform the court's analysis, as suggested 
by the Supreme 
Court and by this Court.  Therefore, we conclude that the District Court 
abused its 
discretion by invoking the doctrine sua sponte. 
     The court made no finding that Coast changed its position in a bad 
faith attempt to 
"assault the dignity or authority" of the court.  In its brief footnote 
explaining its 
invocation of judicial estoppel, the court indeed quoted our statement in 
Ryan Operations 
that judicial estoppel is designed to prevent litigants from "playing fast 
and loose with the 
courts."  Coast I at 6 n.3 (quoting Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 358).  We 
have noted that 
"playing fast and loose with the courts" is a factor in a finding of bad 
faith.  See 
Montrose, 243 F.3d at 780-81; Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 358.  However, 
simply 
quoting this language without any explanation or analysis of how Coast's 
actions rose to 
the level of "playing fast and loose" is insufficient to invoke the harsh 
sanction of judicial 
estoppel.  No finding of culpability, intentional self contradiction, or 
intentional 
wrongdoing was made.  We counseled in Montrose that a mere finding of 
inconsistency, 
without more, fails to fulfill the bad faith requirement.  See id. at 781.  
Furthermore, the 
court also made no explicit finding that Shansab's and counsel's prior 
statements were 
accepted or adopted by the court.  The District Court failed to apply the 
law to the facts 
here, and therefore abused its discretion. 
     Secondly, the District Court did not consider whether its application 
of judicial 
estoppel was tailored to the harm caused by Coast and whether "no lesser 
sanction would 
adequately remedy the damage done by litigant's misconduct."  Montrose, 
243 F.3d at 
784.  The court failed to assess whether a strong instruction to the jury 
that it should 
consider the prior inconsistent statements or some other measure short of 
judicial 
estoppel could have addressed the harm.  We express no opinion whether the 
court's 
application was in fact narrowly tailored, but we find that the court 
itself should have 
conducted such an inquiry and provided its reasoning in the first 
instance. 
     Finally, the District Court invoked judicial estoppel to dismiss many 
of Coast's 
claims even though the parties did not brief the issue nor did it arise at 
oral argument.  
The parties were not on notice that judicial estoppel would be applied, 
and Coast was not 
allowed the opportunity to argue lack of bad faith or contest any other 
factor in the 
application of the doctrine.  In Montrose, we warned that courts should be 
wary of just 
such a sua sponte application of the doctrine.  See Montrose, 243 F.3d at 
780 n.5.  
Further, as we stated in Montrose: 
                    Judicial estoppel "is an 'extraordinary remedy'" that 
should be employed 
          only "'when a party's inconsistent behavior would otherwise 
result in a 
          miscarriage of justice.'"  Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-
Midwest 
          Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Oneida Motor 
          Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d 
Cir.1988) 
          (Stapleton, J., dissenting)). 
 
Montrose, 243 F.3d at 784.   Especially because judicial estoppel is such 
a harsh remedy 
  as this case demonstrates   and should be used only in limited 
circumstances, the court 
should have invited briefing and argument before deploying the doctrine to 
dismiss many 
of Coast's claims. 
     We understand that the District Court did not have the benefit of 
this Court's 
decision in Montrose when it issued its summary judgment orders here.  
However, 
Montrose was based squarely on other decisions of this Court which also 
required the 
same analysis and were available at the time of the District Court's 
ruling.   See, e.g., 
Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 361 (requiring finding that positions taken by 
party to be 
estopped are inconsistent and that the party changed her position in bad 
faith).  Indeed, 
the District Court quoted from Ryan Operations but otherwise failed to 
follow its 
requirements.  Because judicial estoppel is an "extraordinary remedy," it 
should not be 
invoked sua sponte without the detailed, multi-step analysis Montrose 
specifically 
requires.  We find that the court erred in applying judicial estoppel in 
this case. 
 
                               III 
     While we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in 
applying judicial 
estoppel, we find no error in the District Court's consideration of any of 
the other issues 
decided on summary judgment.  Therefore, we only vacate on those claims 
for which the 
judicial estoppel finding of Coast's default formed the sole basis for 
dismissal.  Those 
claims on which the District Court granted summary judgment to VCI on 
other grounds 
are affirmed.  Below we briefly explain the District Court's reliance on 
judicial estoppel 
with respect to each of Coast's claims.  
 
        A.  Claims Dismissed on Basis of Judicial Estoppel 
     We find that seven of Coast's claims -- Counts One, Four, Six, Seven, 
Thirteen, 
Fourteen, and Fifteen -- were dismissed on the basis of the default 
finding, and we 
therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment on those claims. 
     The dismissal of Count One, Breach of Contract, most clearly depended 
on the 
judicial estoppel finding.  The court invoked judicial estoppel in its 
discussion of this 
Count, and the court's finding of default formed the only stated basis for 
granting 
summary judgment to VCI on this contract claim.  See Coast I at 5-7.  We 
vacate the 
grant of summary judgment as to the breach of contract claim. 
          In dismissing Count Four, Lender Liability, the District Court 
stated: 
                    As this Court has granted summary judgment on 
plaintiff's contract, good 
          faith and fair dealing, and fiduciary duty claims, the Fourth 
Count of 
          plaintiff's complaint alleging lender liability will also be 
dismissed as 
          plaintiff has failed to show any breach of duty by the 
defendants' actions. 
 
Coast I at 8 n.5.  Because the court dismissed the contract and good 
faith/fair dealing 
claims on the basis of judicial estoppel, this statement suggests that its 
dismissal of the 
lender liability claim was based on judicial estoppel as well.  We vacate 
as to this claim. 
     On Count Six, Conversion and Concealment of Assets, the court stated 
that: 
                    the security agreements executed between the parties 
provided the 
          defendants with the paramount right to possess the collateral in 
the event of 
          a default, and that Coast would deliver such collateral to the 
defendants.  
          Thus, as a default had occurred, pursuant to the agreements 
between the 
          parties, defendants were entitled to a right of possession. 
 
Coast I at 10-11 (emphasis added).  Because this holding as to the 
conversion claim 
depended on the finding of default, we vacate. 
     Count Seven alleged negligent supervision by VCI of its employees.  
The court 
stated that this count alleged acts of industrial espionage and tortious 
interference similar 
to those contained in other counts (namely Counts 8 and 9, discussed 
below).  The court 
stated that "such claims must fail for the same reasons as previously 
indicated."  Id. at 17 
n.10.  However, the court also stated that "as this Court has found that 
defendants did not 
breach the agreements, plaintiff's negligent supervision claim must also 
fail."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Thus, this claim was dismissed on the basis of the 
judicial estoppel 
default finding, which formed the basis for deciding that VCI did not 
breach the 
Agreements.  We vacate as to this claim. 
     In discussing Count Thirteen, Breach of Implied Contract and Duty of 
Good Faith, 
the court held that "the duty of good faith cannot be invoked by plaintiff 
to preclude 
defendants from exercising their rights under the agreements upon Coast's 
default."  
Coast I at 8 (emphasis added).  Default thus formed the sole basis for 
dismissal.   We 
vacate as to this claim. 
     Finally, Counts Fourteen and Fifteen alleged discrimination by VCI 
under federal 
and state law respectively, on the basis of Shansab's status as a native 
of Afghanistan.  
Coast alleged that VCI terminated Coast's line of credit because of 
Shansab's race.  In its 
second summary judgment order, in which it dismissed these claims, the 
court reviewed 
its first order, and specifically recounted its judicial estoppel finding 
of default.  See 
Coast II at 2-3.  The court expressly relied on the default finding to 
hold that Coast could 
not make a prima face case of discrimination in both its federal and state 
claims because 
it could not prove that Coast was qualified to continue to receive credit.  
Id. at 20-21.  
The court stated at length that its finding of default barred Coast in its 
discrimination 
claim.  Id.  The court also noted that even if Coast could make out a 
prima facie case, 
VCI had a race-neutral reason for its action: that Coast was in default, 
as decided in 
Coast I by judicial estoppel.  Id. at 21-22.  The court concluded that 
Coast's 
discrimination claims were "bereft of any evidence that VCI intentionally 
discriminated 
against Coast... when it exercised its rights under the parties' 
agreements and foreclosed 
on its collateral."  Id. at 22 (emphasis added).  Because the District 
Court's dismissal of 
these discrimination claims was based heavily on the judicial estoppel 
finding of default, 
we vacate as to these claims. 
 
 B.  Claims Dismissed on Grounds Independent of Judicial Estoppel 
     The District Court dismissed nine of Coast's claims against VCI 
without reliance 
on the judicial estoppel analysis.  We do not find any error in the 
court's treatment of the 
following claims, and therefore we affirm the grant of summary judgment to 
VCI on 
these claims. 
     With regard to Count Two, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, the court 
concluded that "no 
independent fiduciary duty is generally owed from a lender to a borrower" 
and that 
"plaintiff has failed to show that defendants owed plaintiff a separate 
duty of care outside 
of its obligations under the various loan agreements."  Coast I at 8.  
Although this 
discussion occurred in the same section in which judicial estoppel was 
invoked, the court 
did not rely on the default finding for dismissal.  We therefore affirm as 
to this claim. 
     The court held on Count Three, Fraud, that "a mere alleged breach of 
contract 
without more does not create the existence of a fraud claim" and that 
plaintiff failed to 
plead fraud with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 
9(b).  Id. at 9- 
10.  Default played no role, and we find no error, so we affirm.  On Count 
Five, Trespass, 
the court similarly did not rely on the default finding but stated that 
"if an individual has 
a cognizable right to enter the property, no action for trespass may lie" 
and that here 
"defendants had a contractual right to enter Coast's premises in order to 
inspect and 
safeguard its collateral, as well as to review Coast's books and records."  
Id. at 10.  To be 
invoked, the contractual right to enter Coast's premises, inspect, and 
review did not 
require default by Coast.  We affirm the dismissal of the trespass claim. 
     Count Eight was dismissed because Coast did not meet the elements of 
"industrial 
espionage."  The court construed Count Nine as alleging tortious 
interference with 
prospective economic advantage, and found that Coast presented no evidence 
to support 
several of the elements of that claim.  The court dismissed Count Ten, 
Unwarranted 
Issuance of Subpoenas, because Coast presented no evidence that subpoenas 
were issued 
wrongly.  On none of these counts did the court rely on the default 
finding, and we find 
no error in its consideration of these claims.  Id. at 16-17.  We 
therefore affirm as to these 
claims. 
     The court found that the bankruptcy remedy of Equitable 
Subordination, which 
Coast requested in Count Eleven, was not warranted here because Coast's 
bankruptcy 
case had been dismissed, Coast lacked standing to bring such a claim, and 
because the 
equitable remedy was not justified on the facts of this case.  Id. at 11-
12.  Default played 
no role, and we find no error.  We affirm the dismissal of Count Eleven. 
     The court found that Coast presented no evidence of agreement to 
support its 
claim of Conspiracy between VCI and codefendants AOA and VOA.  Id. at 12.  
Again, 
default played no role, and we affirm.  Finally, the court dismissed Count 
Sixteen, 
Violation of 42 U.S.C.  1982, because  1982 does not protect contract 
rights such as 
those asserted to be violated here, and therefore Coast could not state a 
claim under  
1982.  We affirm. 
 
                                IV 
     For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court abused its 
discretion in 
invoking judicial estoppel to find that Coast defaulted on the Agreements.  
We vacate the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of VCI on claims 
decided on the 
basis of the court's application of judicial estoppel: Counts One, Four, 
Six, Seven, 
Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen of Coast's Complaint.  We affirm the grant 
of summary 
judgment in favor of VCI on the remainder of Coast's claims: Counts Two, 
Three, Five, 
Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Sixteen.  We remand to the District 
Court for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
_____________________________ 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
 
Kindly file the foregoing Opinion. 
 
 
 
 
                                        /s/ Julio M. Fuentes           
                                            Circuit Judge 
